USA v. Lamont Paige by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-22-2013 
USA v. Lamont Paige 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Lamont Paige" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 56. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/56 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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____________ 
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____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LAMONT E. PAIGE a/k/a MONT 
 
 
Lamont E. Paige, 
               Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-10-cr-00121-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 26, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, FISHER and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 22, 2013  ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
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 Lamont Paige appeals the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania denying his motion to suppress evidence, and the Court’s 
imposition of a 280-month prison sentence.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 On January 20, 2010, two masked men robbed the TruMark Federal Credit Union 
in Jenkintown, Pennsylvania, one of whom threatened employees and patrons with a gun.  
The robbers took money from the tellers’ cash drawers, including two “dye packs” – 
strapped bundles of cash concealing devices that, when removed a certain distance from 
the bank entrance, detonate and spray a mixture of red dye and teargas.  As the robbers 
left the Credit Union, the dye packs exploded.  At trial, the Government presented 
evidence that Paige was one of the two robbers, including video surveillance tapes, 
eyewitness testimony, a dye-stained shoe, and DNA evidence. 
 The District Court held a pretrial hearing on Paige’s motion to suppress the shoe, 
which the FBI lab determined was stained by chemicals consistent with those used in the 
Credit Union’s dye packs.  The shoe was a match to one worn by one of the robbers, as 
seen in a photograph taken from the bank’s security video footage of the robbery, and 
was found in an apartment that had been occupied by Paige.  FBI Special Agent Vito 
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Roselli testified that he and other agents had interviewed Paige’s girlfriend, who told 
them she and Paige had lived together in an apartment at 557 Allengrove Street.  
According to the girlfriend, they had left that apartment because they were $3,000 behind 
on the rent and had received an eviction notice.  She provided the FBI with the landlord’s 
name and telephone number. 
Special Agent Roselli confirmed the identity of the landlord by conducting a 
public records check.  He made four or five “drive bys” of the apartment, looking for 
signs of activity, and checked the license plates on cars parked nearby to determine if 
their registration indicated a relationship to the apartment.  Special Agent Roselli 
observed no activity at the apartment, nor were any of the cars associated with the 
property.  An upstairs neighbor told him that she had not seen the car she knew to be 
associated with the apartment for several days, and that she had heard noises in the 
middle of the night consistent with people moving out.  He contacted the landlord, and 
they met at the apartment on February 12, 2010.  The landlord said he had evicted Paige, 
which was confirmed by a December 16, 2009 notice of eviction addressed to Paige at 
the 557 Allengrove address and a notice posted on the property, and said he was 
arranging to have the apartment cleaned out.  
The landlord consented to a search of the apartment.  When he attempted to 
unlock the front door, he found that his key did not work.  The key worked in the back 
door, but an obstruction prevented it from opening, so Special Agent Roselli climbed in 
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through a window.  Inside, he found the black shoe, a pair of pants, and mail addressed to 
Paige. 
At the suppression hearing, Paige claimed he had discussed the rent issue with the 
landlord in January 2010, and had been given additional time to pay.  He denied having 
been evicted and claimed not to have seen the notice.  Paige also stated that he had not 
been in the apartment since the beginning of February 2010.  The District Court 
concluded that the Government failed to show by clear and unequivocal evidence that 
Paige intended to abandon the apartment, but that the agents reasonably believed that the 
landlord had authority to consent to a search of the property.  Accordingly, the District 
Court denied Paige’s motion to suppress. 
A jury convicted Paige of one count of armed bank robbery and aiding and 
abetting of the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2113(d), and the District Court 
conducted a sentencing hearing on March 22, 2011.  The presentence report (“PSR”) 
assigned a base offense level of 20.  It then added two levels for taking property from a 
financial institution, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(1), and five levels because a firearm was 
brandished during the robbery, id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C).  Paige had ten criminal history 
points, placing him in criminal history category V. 
The PSR also categorized Paige as a career offender based on two prior drug 
convictions: a May 1999 conviction related to drug crimes committed on April 29, 1998; 
and a June 1999 conviction for drug crimes committed on May 13, 1998.  The District 
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Court held that these crimes constituted separate offenses under the Guidelines.  Based on 
his career offender designation, Paige had a final offense level of 34 and a criminal 
history category of VI, resulting in an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 262-327 
months’ imprisonment, capped at 300 months because of the statutory maximum 
sentence for armed bank robbery.  The District Court imposed a sentence of 280 months.  
This timely appeal followed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  “This Court reviews the 
District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual 
findings and exercises plenary review of the District Court’s application of the law to 
those facts.”  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  
We “review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear error and . . . exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.”  United States v. 
Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007).  We review the substantive reasonableness of 
the sentence imposed for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 
567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). 
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III.
 
 
 On appeal, Paige argues that the District Court erred in (A) denying his motion to 
suppress evidence, (B) treating him as a career offender, and (C) imposing a 
substantively unreasonable sentence.  Each of these arguments fails. 
A. 
We first consider Paige’s argument that he is entitled to a new trial because the 
jury heard evidence gained through an unconstitutional search of his home.  The District 
Court concluded that the search of the apartment at 557 Allengrove Street, which led to 
the discovery of the black shoe stained with red dye, satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirements because it was based on Special Agent Rosselli’s reasonable belief that the 
landlord had authority to consent to the search.  Supp. App. at 410.  We agree. 
While it is true that a landlord may not consent to a search of a tenant’s apartment, 
see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961), it is also true that when a 
person voluntarily abandons property, he no longer has an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the property, see United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 307-
08 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (“There can 
be nothing unlawful in the Government’s appropriation of . . . abandoned property.”).  
When an apartment is abandoned, authority to consent to a search reverts to the landlord.  
United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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“A search is constitutional if it is based on reasonable belief that a third party had 
authority to consent.”  Bolden v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 828 n.29 
(3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).  Special Agent Roselli reasonably believed that the 
landlord had authority to consent to the search, and therefore we need not determine 
whether he was mistaken in his factual conclusion that Paige had abandoned the 
apartment.  See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (“Whether the basis for 
such authority exists is the sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement 
officials must be expected to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment 
requires is that they answer it reasonably.”).  The landlord told Special Agent Roselli that 
he evicted Paige and his girlfriend and intended to clean out the apartment. Special Agent 
Roselli saw the landlord’s December 16, 2009 notice of eviction and the notice posted at 
the apartment, which was consistent with his surveillance and his interviews of Paige’s 
girlfriend and neighbor.  Special Agent Roselli had a reasonable belief that the landlord 
had authority to consent to a search of the apartment, and therefore the District Court did 
not err in admitting into evidence the shoe seized during this search. 
B. 
We next consider whether the District Court erred in designating Paige a career 
offender under the Sentencing Guidelines.  Our review is for “reasonableness,” which the 
Supreme Court has crystallized into a two step inquiry: first, whether the District Court’s 
sentencing decision was procedurally sound; and second, whether it was substantively 
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reasonable.  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  Ensuring the proper calculation of the Guidelines range 
falls under the procedural prong.  United States v. Smalley, 517 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
On April 29, 1998, Paige sold cocaine to an undercover police officer.  He pleaded 
guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance on May 13, 1999, and 
was sentenced on June 11, 1999 to a term of imprisonment exceeding one year and one 
month.  On May 13, 1998, officers of the Norristown, Pennsylvania police department 
observed Paige selling cocaine.  He was found guilty of possession with intent to 
distribute a controlled substance on June 8, 1999, and sentenced to a prison term 
exceeding one year and one month on September 30, 1999.   
The career offender designation applies if: 
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant 
committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of 
conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled 
substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  Paige contests neither the age nor the crime of violence 
requirement.  Rather, he argues that the District Court incorrectly concluded that he had 
two qualifying prior convictions. 
 The Sentencing Guidelines construe the phrase “two prior felony convictions” to 
mean two felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense, or any combination thereof, that occurred prior to the commission of the instant 
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offense of conviction, and that are counted separately under the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), 
(b), or (c).  Id. § 4B1.2(c).  The computation of criminal history points under § 4A1.1 is, 
in turn, governed by § 4A1.2, which provides that multiple prior sentences are to be 
counted separately if “the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated by an 
intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing 
the second offense).”  Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2).  In the absence of an intervening arrest, the 
sentences are to be counted separately “unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses 
contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the 
same day.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 The District Court properly counted Paige’s two prior drug trafficking convictions 
separately for purposes of the career-offender designation.  Paige does not argue that both 
offenses were charged in the same instrument, or that he was sentenced for both on the 
same day.  Rather, he argues that the offenses should not be counted separately because 
there was no intervening arrest between the dates of conviction.  In other words, because 
Paige was convicted for the April 29, 1998 offense on May 13, 1999, and was convicted 
for the May 13, 1998 drug offense on June 8, 1999, there was no intervening arrest 
between the May 13, 1999 and June 8, 1999 dates of conviction.  Paige contends that the 
absence of such an arrest means that the offenses should not have been counted 
separately. 
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 This argument entirely ignores the latter half of § 4A1.2(a)(2), which expressly 
states that when there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted separately 
unless they arose from the same charging instrument, or were imposed on the same day.  
Neither is the case here.  Paige committed drug trafficking offenses on two separate 
occasions, fourteen days apart, for which he was separately charged and sentenced.  He 
therefore had two prior qualifying felony convictions, and the District Court did not err 
by classifying him as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. 
C. 
 Paige’s final argument is that the 280-month sentence imposed by the District 
Court is substantively unreasonable.  The “touchstone of reasonableness” is whether, on 
consideration of the record as a whole, the District Court meaningfully and rationally 
considered the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 
(citation omitted).  “[W]e must give due deference to the district court’s determination 
that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the sentence.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  We may, but are not required to, apply a presumption of 
reasonableness to a sentence within the Guidelines range.  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
 The District Court’s sentence of 280 months, within the Guidelines range of 262-
300 months, was substantively reasonable.  The District Court considered the nature and 
circumstances of the robbery, Paige’s criminal history, the need to punish a serious 
offense and deter future criminal conduct, and the need to provide Paige with correctional 
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rehabilitation.  Supp. App. at 424; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  The District Court noted 
that Paige’s codefendant brandished a firearm during the robbery, and that two victims 
were emotionally traumatized and attended counseling as a result.  Supp. App. at 425.  
Paige was designated a career offender and has an extensive criminal history of drug 
trafficking offenses, and although the instant offense was his first involving an overt act 
of violence, prior periods of incarceration failed to deter Paige from criminal conduct.  
The District Court concluded that Paige presents “a serious threat to the public safety and 
the community,” and that a significant prison sentence within the Guidelines range was 
therefore warranted.  Id. at 425-26.  The District Court meaningfully and rationally 
considered the factors identified in § 3553(a), and did not abuse its discretion in 
sentencing Paige to a term of imprisonment of 280 months. 
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District Court 
denying Paige’s motion to suppress, and affirm the Court’s imposition of a 280-month 
prison sentence. 
